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ANTITRUST POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY
Richard B. Wilsont
Perhaps the American antitrust story may best be characterized as
an interweaving of two grand themes. The first of these is capsulized in
George Stocking's paraphrase of Pope's poem:
Monopoly is a monster of such frightful mien
That to be hated needs but to be seen.
But seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.1
This, then, is the empirical theme, and it consists of facts: the fact
of giant firms, of the increasing prevalence of monopoly, oligopoly, and
imperfect markets-and all these despite hearty periodic rededication to
the Sherman Act and its principles. For many thoughtful scholars, great
corporate power is necessary, inevitable, ineradicable, and perhaps even
desirable. A. A. Berle, one of the most persuasive spokesmen for this
view, concludes that "until a combination of technique and organization
can be invented permitting individuals to do the job (of producing the
complex consumer goods demanded by modern society), we are bound
to make the best we can out of the situation. To my mind most of the
results are rather surprisingly good." 2
In a recent study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee,
Theodore Kreps succinctly stated the second theme: "Historically antitrust policy, like a gnarled oak subjected to unsystematic pruning by
weather, animals, and man, has grown irregularly, inconsistently, from
various origins and in several directions."'
This illumines the theoretical theme. Its motif is confusion, uncertainty,
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 579, for biographical data.
1 Stocking, "The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium," 39
American Economic Review 719 (June 1949).
2 Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society 15 (Fund For The Republic 1957).
3 Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., An Evaluation of Antitrust Policy:
Its Relation to Economic Growth, Full Employment, and Prices 2 (Study Paper No. 22
prepared by Kreps 1960) (hereinafter cited as study Paper No. 22, Joint Econ. Comm.).
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and indecision; it embraces sharply contrasting views about "what is"
and "what ought to be" within all disciplines claiming jurisdiction over
the antitrust arena. Judicial vacillation between per se prohibitions and
extensive market behavior analysis (in a word, between strict enforcement
and the "rule of reason") confirms and reflects theoretical economic dispute about the nature and consequences of monopolistic competition.
Both orientations, in turn, mirror pervasive theoretical arguments about
the role and relative weight to be assigned such basic social values as
freedom, equality, efficiency, and power distribution within an urban,
industrial democracy.
Both the "fact" of corporate revolution and the theoretical response
which knows not what to make of that fact have had an obvious impact
on American constitutional development. So, too, have they both obscured and made difficult attempts to measure the course of that development. The instruments of constitutional design-legislators, administrators, and judges-have found it imperative to recognize (at least sub
silentio) the "fact," but in seeking for ways to legitimate and control it,
they have been bounded and frustrated by the perplexities and uncertainties of current social theory. If, then, proliferating organizational
power may properly be viewed as the dominant economic fact of our
time, and if the economic arrangements of society can be said to be the
paramount concern of an industrialized nation, then failure to develop a
reasonably coherent theory of public affairs both to describe and to
prescribe for that fact points to a constitutional crisis of considerable
magnitude. Herein lies both the piquancy and the gravity of current
efforts to assess the impact of the antitrust ideas on patterns of constitutional growth.
It will be the central thesis of these remarks that legislative and administrative-if not judicial-interpretation of antitrust policy has affirmed the legitimacy of large-scale corporate organization, apparently
justifying the result by an appeal to theories of imperfect competition;
that the courts, contrary to the view expressed by a host of contemporary
commentators, have largely rejected current economic doctrine as the
paramount rationale in antitrust cases, although they, too, have found
it necessary to accomodate to the "fact" of bigness; that, finally, the
judiciary has, in recent years, begun to shape a "constitutional" (as distinguished from an economic) position from which to challenge the consequences of monopoly; the root of this emerging position appears to be a
concern for equality rather than for liberty, and its ultimate implication
may well be a "constitutionalization" of the major centers of economic
power.
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A subsidiary theme interpenetrating and connecting all these propositions is the largely unexplored relationship between antitrust policy
and economic doctrine, on the one hand, and between both of these and
general social theory, on the other. While it is clear enough that current
notions of imperfect competition have influenced the position of Congress, the Executive, academic commentators, and (to a lesser degree)
the courts, the deeper theoretical roots of imperfect competition have not
been laid bare, nor has their connection with the more significant trends
of current social thought been systematically examined. It would appear
likely, however, that an antitrust analysis predominantly influenced by
concepts of workable competition does reflect in vague and tentative ways
our current theoretical preoccupation with the ideas of community and
of scientific organization. As Sheldon Wolin has recently pointed out,
"the political and social thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was largely centered on the attempt to restate the value of community, that is of the need for human beings . . . to experience some

closer solidarity than the nature of urbanized and industrialized society
seemed willing to grant. .

. At the same time . . . the nineteenth

century was a period saturated with the idea of organization. ' 4 If these
seminal doctrines of modern social thought have influenced the formation
of economic theory and through it the development of antitrust policy,
then they have equally affected the basic assumptions of public policy,
or, if you will, the constitutional assumptions upon the basis of which
we respond to the facts of economic life.
Each of these propositions and the doctrinal thread which relates them
deserves greater elaboration than can be attempted in a brief discussion.
But perhaps the rough sketch and the broader canvas will reveal with
more clarity some of the causes of conceptual confusion in the antitrust
area.
I.
What have been the patterns of antitrust action in the postwar period?
From out of the welter of learned comment, politically motivated manifestos and ambiguities of official doctrine, can a general thrust and
dominant demand of policy be identified? Has there been, as alleged, a
confirmation of bigness and a more permissive attitude toward heretofore
suspect practices?
Answers to these and related queries seem to depend upon the authority
one chooses to read. George Stocking concludes "that cultural environment-the economic and social milieu-determine the attitudes of the
4

IWolin,

Politics and Vision 363-64 (1960).
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Courts in antitrust decisions; and that economists who, like judges, have
responded to the same influences, have afforded in the concept of workable competition a logical basis for a lax administration of the Sherman
Act." 5 More vehemently, Adams and Gray see "a gradual but unmistakable retreat from the traditional anti-monopoly policy which for over
three hundred years has prevailed in the Anglo-Saxon community toward
an ambiguous and somewhat apologetic acceptance of monopoly as a
necessary, even desirable, form of economic organization." 6
On the other hand, Robert Solo in a recent article for The Antitrust
Bulletin asserts that "After acting for nearly a century as the prime
guardian of status and barrier to social intervention, since the early 1940s
the Court has become . . . the harbinger of basic reform.17 This is so
because the Court regards government as "no longer merely defensive
and protective. It is positive and creative." Hence, the "new role of the
Court" provides a "positive and creative government . . . the freedom
to choose and plan."18 Finally, Fainsod, Gordon and Palamountain, in
their admirable text, underscore what appears to be a general belief in the
"new" Sherman Act. "Beginning in the late 1930s," they assert, "antitrust activity was revived as the cardinal feature of American public
policy toward the bulk of industry. Except for the war years, this revival
has continued down to the present day. It has been marked by broader
judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, more ample Congressional
support, and more vigorous executive enforcement. . ..
What evidence is offered in support of each of these polar interpretations, one of which we might label as affirmative, the other critical? Those
who find new vitality and doctrinal strength in postwar antitrust policy
point mainly to the work of the courts. Negatively, judicial restraint is
said to have softened or eliminated many of the constitutional limitations
previously functioning as barriers to economic regulation. Thus, a more
liberal interpretation of the commerce and welfare clauses facilitates expanded and more effective federal control, while judicial restrictions on
the scope of substantive due process liberate both state and national
governments from the narrow gospel of private property. Positively, a
number of landmark decisions construing the major antitrust statutes
during the past two decades are hailed as salutary and strengthening in5 Stocking, "Economic Change and the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on 'Workable
Competition,'" 4 Antitrust Bull. 375, 425 (1959).
6 Adams & Gray, Monopoly in America 1 (1955).
7 Solo, "The New Look in the Constitutional Structure of Public Regulation," 4 Antitrust Bull. 503 (1959).
8 Id. at 511.
9 Fainsod, Gordon, & Palamountain, Government and the American Economy 570
(1959). See also Rostow, "The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress,"
14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567 (1947).
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novations. The Alcoa ruling, 10 for example, is seen as a partial abandonment, or at least a significant modification, of the "rule of reason," as a
rejection of the U. S. Steel" doctrine that unexercised monopoly power
is no offense, and as a denial of the defenses of "innocent intent" and
"efficient performance." The Cement, 2 Paramount,13 and American
Tobacco'4 decisions have supposedly mitigated the evidentiary problems
of enforcement agencies by affirming the concept of "conscious parallel
action," while the four major divorcement orders of the postwar period
(Pullman, Paramount, United Fruit and Yellow Cab)'-, are said to indicate a revival of divestiture as the ultimate enforcement weapon. A
significant expansion in the Sherman Act's coverage is believed to result
from its recent applications to boxing, 16 the legitimate theatre,17 newspaper publishing, 8 and building construction. 19 The intra-enterprise
conspiracy decisions (Timkin Roller Bearing, Keifer-Stewart, and Yellow
Cab),2 by holding that illegal conspiracy may exist within the confines
of a single firm, are regarded as a firm reassertion that the artificiality of
corporate structure must give way to the demands of competition. In a
number of recent decisions the ancillary benefits of patent monopolies
(such as cross-licensing), originally exempted from Sherman Act prosecution in the General Electric case, 21 have been severely curbed. Hence,
Line Material,Gypsum, New Wrinkle, and National Lead22 are believed
to have narrowed a significant constitutional salient in the antitrust
perimeter. Finally, there is alleged to have been an effective extension
of the per se doctrine in unfair practices cases arising under both the
Clayton and Sherman Acts: boycotts2 3 and collusive price-fixing2 4 have
I' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), modified
148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945).
11 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
12 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
13 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
14 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
15 United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd per curiam,
330 U.S. 806 (1946); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
United States v. United Fruit Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1958 Trade Cas.) ff 68941 (E.D. La.
1958); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
16 United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
17 United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
18 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
19 United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
20 United States v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
21 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
22 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S.
371 (1952); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
23 See United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La. 1957);
United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
24 Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
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been reaffirmed as per se violations; tying contracts, likewise, are now
held to be per se offenses where the seller enjoys a monopolistic position
in the market for the "tying" product;25 exclusive dealerships may now
be prohibited when they affect a "substantial" portion of a particular line
of commerce even though competition may not actually be diminished as
a result of their use, and hence "quantitative substantiality" is said to
place exclusive dealerships within the per se category; 26 facts proving
the existence of price discrimination are now alleged to create a prima
facie violation of Sec. 2(a) of the Clayton Act,27 while the "meeting
competition" and "legitimate cost difference" defenses are thought to
have been largely eroded away; 2" and, of signal importance is believed
to be a stiffening judicial resistence to mergers, both past and prospective,
2 9 and the Youngstown-Bethlehem"
as indicated by the DuPont-GM.
decisions.
The affirmative point of view thus derives from twenty-five or thirty
key decisions which have come down since 1940 and which are interpreted as broadening and toughening anti-monopoly policy. Critics of
antitrust performance, while they would place a considerably, less optimistic construction on these judicial results, direct their most effective fire
at the other two branches of government. Their arguments are persuasive, if not compelling.
If it is true, as one commentator has recently remarked, that economic
regulation is "social engineering, far removed from the settlement of disputes in equity or the minimization of crime,""' then it is in legislation and
administration that we must seek the constitutional configuration of antitrust policy.
Congress has been characterized as a "promoter of monopoly" and as
the creator of "unwise, discriminatory, privilege-creating . . .measures
which throttle competition and restrict opportunity."" Verification of
this sweeping judgment may be sought in four different areas of legislative performance.
First, as Donald Dewey remarks, "The total amount of money spent
to enforce the antitrust laws over sixty-five years would not buy a
medium-size naval vessel . . .. s Nor have appropriations increased
25 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957); Times-Picayune Pub. Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
26 Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
27 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
28 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
29 United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
30 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
3' Solo, supra note 7, at 505-06.
32 Adams & Gray, supra note 6, at vii.
33 Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law 302 (1959).
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significantly in the postwar decades. The annual expenditures of the
Antitrust Division decreased from approximately 3-2/3 million in 1951
to a low of 3 million in 1955, and then rose to an estimated 3-4 million
for the current fiscal year. 4 Hence, anticipated expenditures this year
will be about 5 per cent above those of a decade ago. These inadequate
appropriations produced a 27 per cent decrease in the Division's staff
between 1951 and 1955 and there has been only slight improvement in
the last five years.3 5 According to the Head of the Antitrust Division,
the number of attorneys available per action instituted declined from
6.57 in 1952 to 4.02 in 1957, while appropriation dollars per action
similarly decreased from $114,000 in 1952 to $65,000 in 1957.38 It is
true, of course, that the Division's annual appropriations during the
1950's averaged roughly ten times those of the 1930's. However, the
average federal budget increased over seven times in the same period.
while the average annual gross national product increased nearly five
times.3 7 If account is taken of an over 50 per cent decline in the value
of the dollar, and if financing efforts are evaluated in relation to the total
cost of government and to the magnitude of enforcement problems in an
expanding economy, then it might be argued that antitrust appropriations
have, in effect, diminished, or at least that they have not, in real terms, increased significantly. While the volume and complexity of antitrust work
is not necessarily proportional to the size of the gross national product,
nevertheless, reason would seem to indicate that the greater number of
transactions and the larger number of firms, particularly large ones, increases the opportunities for violation; the assumption of a rough correlation between workload and gross national product is probably a tenable
one.
The erosion of antitrust coverage by statutory exemptions constitutes
a second measure of legislative performance. At present there are twentytwo such statutes; twenty-one additional acts vest the enforcement of
antitrust policy rather ineffectually in various regulatory commissions. 8
Hence, it is estimated that over 70 per cent of all goods and services
purchased by consumers are exempt from antitrust prohibitions.3 9 Not
only have recent Congresses failed to reduce significantly the wide scope
of this immunity, but by the McGuire Act they have reinforced resale
34 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, pt. 1, at 17 (1957).
35 Budget of the United States Government (1951-1959 incl.).
36 Hearings, supra note 34, at 18.
37 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (Income & Output Supp., March,
1959).
38 Study Paper No. 22, joint Econ. Comm. 17.
39 Id. at 2.
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price maintenance, 40 by the McCarran Act agreements among insurance
companies have been exempted to the extent that otherwise satisfactory
regulation is provided by state law,41 and under the provisions of the
Reed-Bulwinkle Act rate-fixing agreements among railroads and motor
carriers which receive the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission have been legitimatized.1 Thus, contemporary legislation has
widened and fortified a critical gap in our anti-monopoly defenses.
Congressional failure to respond to insistent demands for legislative
strengthening of both the substantive and enforcement features of the
antitrust laws provide a third yardstick for evaluation. Against such
admittedly invigorating innovations as the Antimerger Act of 1950, the
increase in maximum criminal fines from $10,000 to $50,000, and the
provision that cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission
be made final when issued, must be measured a refusal to consider seriously such proposals as the following: that civil and criminal penalties
be reinforced, or even replaced, by the much more effective weapon of
charter revocation under a uniform federal incorporation law; that fragmented enforcement authority now scattered among a number of commissions and agencies be centralized in the FTC and the Antitrust
Division; that large firms be statutorily prohibited from occupying more
than a given percentage of any particular market; that Congress reverse
by legislation the Standard of Indiana rule43 which makes the "good faith
meeting of competition" proviso an absolute defense to charges of price
discrimination under section 2 of the Clayton Act; that a system of
treaties be negotiated to protect the American economy against the adverse effects of restrictive international cartels; that section 4 of the
Clayton Act be broadened to allow the government as well as private
parties to collect damages resulting from violations of the antitrust laws;
that section 4 further be amended to authorize private treble-damage
actions specifically against producers who refuse to deal with retailers
who, in turn, do not wish to enter into exclusive dealing arrangements;
that all re-sale price maintenance laws be repealed.
It is beside the point that these and other proposals might prove, upon
mature reflection, to be unwarranted. Failure to consider them seriously
refutes to some extent the claim of increasing "legislative support" for
the antitrust idea.
The final test of congressional performance is to be found in the
antitrust implications of certain federal regulatory and promotional pro40 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 USC § 45 (1958).
41 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 USC § 1011 (1958).

42 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 16 USC § 577 (1958).
43 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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grams. Specifically, it is alleged that the independent regulatory commissions, particularly the FCC, the CAB, and FPC, have positively encouraged high concentrations of ownership within the industries for
which they are responsible, 44 that defense procurement policies have unduly rewarded the existing industrial giants or have contributed to
the development of new ones, and that the statutory basis for the commercial exploitation of atomic energy discourages competition and may
well promote monopoly in a potentially crucial industry.45 The substance
of these charges cannot be explored here. Essentially, they rest upon
evidence purporting to show a significant decrease in the number of
licensees or contractors, an inordinate increase in the profits of regulated
firms and defense suppliers, and a proliferation of artificially created
barriers to entry, with a consequent restriction of competition far below
its technically potential level. Again, while the accuracy of these assertions is subject to debate, available evidence casts considerable doubt on
the firmness and direction of legislative contributions to antitrust policy.
As the legislative record of the past two decades reveals no excessive
devotion to the antitrust ideal, so administrative performance has been
equally lacking in steady purpose and similarly marked by ambiguity.
Manifestly, a thorough survey of recent executive experience46 cannot
be attempted here. It should be enough to remark that administrative
agencies are buffeted by Presidential policy, conflicting interest group
demands, vacillating judicial doctrine, and the often inconsistent views
of scholarly commentators. It is not surprising that attempts to accommodate these heterogeneous influences have produced a pragmatic
and frequently opportunistic course of conduct. Thus, in cases instituted
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Antitrust Division has tended to
press for wider acceptance of what it conceives to be the Alcoa 47 rule
that size alone is sufficient to convict.48 In section 1 proceedings, on the
other hand, the Division has been inclined to abandon the doctrine of
conscious parallel action and to emphasize economic tests of industry
performance. Finally, there is little evidence of an intention to exploit
vigorously in the anti-merger field the opportunities provided by the
DuPont-G.M. decision. On the whole, the performance of both the
44 See "Hearings on the Economic Report of the President," 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at
163, 164, 187, 393, 394, 2039ff (1955).
45 Adams & Gray, supra note 6, at 142-63.
46 For a more complete exploration of recent executive performance in the anti-trust
field see Wilson, "The Eisenhower Antitrust Policy: Progressivism or Conservatism?"
32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 179 (1960).
47 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
48 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).
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Division and the Federal Trade Commission reflects an erratic quality
which can probably be understood only against the broader background
of recent policy developments in other, but related, areas.
II.

How, then, may we summarize the constitutional impact of legislative
policy and administrative performance during the past two decades of
antitrust experience? First, there is little evidence that either branch of
government has sought singlemindedly to realize the classical promise of
an atomistic market and an individualized ethic by maximizing price competition, effectively dispersing the existing centers of economic power, or
facilitating entry of new firms into artificially blocked market areas. If
the optimistic commentators assume a model of perfect or near-perfect
competition as a standard of judgment, then the modern record does not
bear out their sanguine impressions of revitalized and improved performance. Second, it would appear that those critics who focus on congressional inaction, executive passivity or ambiguity, and political conformity to
a theory of imperfect competition are closer than are their optimistic colleagues to an accurate assessment of recent antitrust experience. Third, the
underlying constitutional significance of neither legislative nor administrative contributions to antitrust policy are easily identified or assessed.
If the core of a constitutional system is viewed in McIlwain's terms, as
the balancing of jurisdictis and gubernaculum4 9-- of law and will-then
constitutional theory is properly to be viewed as a coherent explanation
and justification for the balance which is, at some given moment, achieved.
Hence, an explication of the constitutional impact of any concrete program such as antitrust involves at least an attempt to identify and to
justify the currently accepted goals of both law and will, and to trace the
causal relationship between those goals and the action program under
investigation. We will, however, search in vain for the articulation of
such an authoritative theory by either congress or the executive. Nor
is this surprising, in view of the excessively pragmatic and nondoctrinaire
character of the American governmental tradition. Certain tentative,
often conflicting, and vaguely formulated objectives, however, can be
inferred from recent legislative and executive activity; these, in turn,
imply a certain view of interpersonal and intergroup relations, as well
as a general formulation of the freedom-authority equation.
As protection of the individual against coercive state power, and, later,
rescue of the underprivileged from poverty and want, were the dominant
49 Mcflwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern 145-46 (1958).
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social demands of earlier epochs, so preservation of the community from
the external threats of a foreign power and an alien ideology have become
the central preoccupations of our own time. The public will has shifted
from a focus on individual freedom to an excessive concern with national
security. Legislative and executive contributions to the legal implementation of and control over this will have therefore stressed certain intermediate goals best calculated to effectuate the overriding security objective. In the antitrust area emphasis has been placed on efficiency;
efficiency in production, in meeting the demands of consumers, in technological innovation, and in defense production. 0 Legislative and executive action-as distinguished from explanationand justification-appears
to be premised on the assumption that efficiency in these matters is a
function of size, organization, and experience. Defense Department
pressure on the Attorney General to drop his demand for a divorce of
Western Electric from the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
on grounds of national defense requirements is but one instance of this
assumption at work. 51 Although the impact of giant firms and their
strategic defense role on other values-such as economic growth, full
employment, stable prices, and small business opportunities-have not
gone unnoticed, 5 an unwillingness to endanger the dominant security
goal by positive implementation of these other values has created, by
inaction if nothing else, a certain immunity for large concentrations of
economic power. Hence, the older constitutional concern with dispersing
centers of power and with maximizing the economic freedom of small
producers and consumers has been thrust into the background.
Although congress and the executive have been unable to provide any
overt, systematic explanation for the balance which has been struck between popular demands for security and the constitutional requirements
of liberty, they have adopted, at least in part, a conveniently available
theory from the economists: the theory of imperfect competition. It is
this idea, which we earlier characterized as a doctrinal thread connecting
and relating the major antitrust concepts of the postwar period,53 that
furnishes intellectual support for the majority report of the Attorney
General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, the 1952 Report of
the Business Advisory Committee of the Commerce Department, and
many of the FTC's recent decisions. It is a theory, moreover, whose
50 See Chamberlain, "Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 85
(May 1950).
51 Antitrust Subcommittee on the Judiciary, Consent Decree Program of the Department
of justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
52 Study Paper No. 22, Joint Economic Committee, 24-46.
3 P. 506 supra.
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implications are not only consistent with but strongly reinforcing of
national security requirements for efficiency and large firms.
Stripped to its essentials, this concept holds that contemporary technical and institutional conditions are incompatible with pure competition
and atomistic markets, that competition is workable, although imperfect,
if there is an absence of collusion within the industry, relative freedom
of entry, and evidence of exemplary behavior such as constant product
improvement, downward movement of prices reflecting constantly decreasing costs, and concentration of production in units of optimum size."'
Hence, oligopoly markets, price leadership, selective price cutting, mergers, and quality differentiation rather than price competition are permissible so long as the industry in question meets certain standards of
economic performance. The doctrinal upshot of this position is the
preservation of competition-albeit imperfect-rather than the protection
of individual competitors. Hence, while the need for a certain degree of
power fragmentation is admitted, the resulting centers of economic influence turn out to be groups rather than individuals-either large, vertically-integrated producers, loosely-knit horizontal combinations under
the influence of a price-leader, or integrated suppliers functioning as
monopsonists. Unfortunately, the proper relationship to be struck among
these groups, within them, and between them and the state, has not been
comprehensively formulated within the framework of current economic
doctrine. When viewed exclusively from the perspective of economic
man, the theory does posit a producer-consumer relationship supposedly
guaranteeing maximum output, minimum price, and constant product
improvement, as well as an inter-producer relationship allegedly providing the most efficient, long-run allocation of resources. But what is to
guarantee the preconditions necessary for the successful development of
these relationships? How, in short, is conspiracy to be precluded, entry
of new competitors made reasonably possible, and a minimum degree of
competition preserved? It would appear that the unarticulated major
premise upon which these economic relationships are grounded is an
assumption of automaticity suspiciously similar to the classical concept
of a mechanically self-adjusting price market. So Galbraith sees effective
control of monopoly in the development of certain centers of countervailing power, Schumpeter in a process of "creative destruction" of firms and
industries, Berle in the spontaneous self-restraint of business leaders.55
54 See Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., Ch. 7 (1955); Mason, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem, 351-70 (1957); Clark, "Toward A Concept of
Workable Competition," 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 241 (June 1940).
55 Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (19541; Galbraith, American
Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952); Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy (1st ed. 1942).
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Common to these otherwise differentiated views is a belief that the factors
which limit power are automatically generated by the conditions which
produce power. This being so, the state, in its role as umpire, need not
be overly concerned with positive efforts to shape inter-group and interpersonal relationships.
In brief, theories of imperfect competition imply a theory of the state
not essentially different from that implicit in nineteenth century liberalism.
Replace the individual entrepreneur with the giant firm, augment the
hedonistic calculus with faith in efficiency, and assume an "invisible
hand" whose fingers point to social duty as well as to self-interest, and
the parallel becomes striking. Schumpeter tells us that "most of the
creations of the intellect or fancy pass away for good after a time that
varies between an after-dinner hour and a generation. Some, however,
do not. .

.

. These we may call the great ones. .

. ."I'

So it is with the

seductively simple notion that "that government is best which governs
least"--least being a quantum that is relative to time and condition.
Greatness, of course, may reside in persistence rather than in truth, as
it did for Schumpeter in his original application of this idea to Marxism.
All of this is not to assert that the political implications of current economic doctrine have been systematically analyzed, or that their epistemological, psychological, and ethical roots have been exhumed and examined.
On the contrary, the constitutional significance of current economic
speculation seems to have gone largely unrecognized except by those few
theorists who remain focused on the concepts and language of economic
science. We point here merely to a tendency, the consequences of which
0
require more serious exploration than they have yet received.
Thus far, little has been said about judicial contributions to antitrust
policy. It has been observed that the optimistic commentators find a
salutary and invigorating influence in the postwar decisions, while the
critics see only continuing confusion, indecision, or virtual surrender to
monopoly. But what are the standards of evaluation for each of these
groups? Such critics as George Stocking, Corwin Edwards, Dirlam and
Kahn, and Adams and Gray" are suspicious of the newer models of
imperfect competition and lean toward some practically attainable version of the atomized market as an ideal situation, while the optimists are
either inclined to embrace the newer economic formulae or to avoid
altogether the thorny task of specifying evaluative models. But both
56 Schumpeter, id. at 3.
57 Stocking & Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise (1951); Edwards, Maintaining
Competition: Requisites of a Government Policy (1949); Dirlam & Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Anti-trust Policy (1954); Adams & Gray, Monopoly in
America (1955).
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schools, whether approving or disapproving, tend to analyze recent judicial doctrine in terms of economic categories and concepts generally,
and within a framework of imperfect competition specifically. This approach suggests a number of critical questions: Have theories of imperfect competition so influenced the courts themselves as to predominantly shape the course of antitrust law? If so, what has been the effect
on constitutional development and how shall we evaluate that effect?
If not, is it either wise or fruitful to persist in the effort to fit judicial
propositions into the narrower categories of economic theory? Finally,
if we abandon the present interpretive trend, what alternative analytical
framework is available? It is with these questions in mind that we
turn to a closer inspection of the recent antitrust decisions.
If, in the language of Chief Justice Hughes, "[T]he [Sherman] Act
has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions," 5 then we might expect judicial construction of antitrust policy to reflect a dominant preoccupation with those
concerns which have traditionally defined the core of our constitutional
system-diffusion of power, legitimate and responsible exercise of authority, and preservation of the dignity, liberty, and equality of the
individual. These concerns, it is submitted, are considerably broader,
involve a more elaborate range of considerations than do the more limited
economic objectives of efficiency in production, organization, and distribution. Although it has become fashionable to analyze the court's antitrust work primarily within the narrower economic framework, and
although many judicial decisions have been, in part, cast in the language
6f current economic speculation, nevertheless it would be a mistake to
impute to the judiciary an exclusive or even predominant concern with
implementing contemporary theories of imperfect competition. J. M.
Clark, Joan Robinson, and others, may have been read into the Sherman
Act, but their constructs have been viewed more as means than as ends.
To what extent has a judicial consideration of means permeated and
colored the postulation of ends to be achieved by antitrust policy?
Tlle core of most Sherman Act decisions has been the familiar "Rule of
Reason." As originally formulated in the Standard Oil case, 8 this concept was not intended as a device for distinguishing "good" trusts from
"bad" ones, but rather as a measure of the anti-competitive effects of
certain market structures and conduct. Price-fixing, destruction of competitors, and exclusion of new entrants were considered violations whether
or not the firms involved were well-managed, progressive, and benevolent.
58 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
59 Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Hence, Justice McKenna could announce in his U. S. Steel opinion that
the law does not make mere size or unexerted power an offense. "It, we
repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its
power to repress or punish them."6 0
But if the Rule of Reason was not originally intended as an umbrella
over imperfect markets, it was nevertheless susceptible of such an interpretation. Does a particular market structure or a certain course of
conduct result in less price competition, greater destruction of competitors, or exclusion of more potential entrants than would some alternative
situation? If the Rule of Reason is viewed in this light-if, in short, it
rests upon the assumption that certain anti-competitive effects are implicit
in all successful competition-then elaborate economic analysis involving
price policy, production quality, conduct of firms, boundaries of the
market, number of firms in the industry, etc., becomes the necessary
prerequisite to judgment. In this sense, the Rule of Reason becomes a
pseudonym for "workable competition."
In section 2 cases, however, there is little indication that the Rule has
received this interpretation. The Alcoa,6 1Pullman,6 2 United Shoe,6 3 and
Kansas City Star64 decisions evince a judicial tendency to discover in
market dominance, coupled with exclusionary practices, the power to fix
price and to block potential entrants. Alcoa's control of 90 per cent of
the nation's aluminum ingot production, observed Judge Hand, "necessarily had a direct effect on the ingot market."65 Hence, he concluded,
the company "was free to raise its prices as it chose, since it was free
from domestic competition ....
66 Only so long as the monopoly remains inert is it valid to argue that the mere existence of power does not
constitute an exercise of power. "[A]s soon as the monopoly began to
operate; for, when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it
must sell at some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price
which it itself fixed."67 In none of these cases was it considered necessary
to weigh industry performance, to speculate on the comparative advantages of giant firms, or to evaluate price trends, quality improvement, and
technological innovation.
If the Rule of Reason, in the sense of market structure, has been the
dominant rationale in section 2 cases, then the doctrine of Conscious
60 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
61 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
02 United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
63 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.) (1953).
64 Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).
65 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
66 Id. at 426.
67 Id. at 428.
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Parallel Action has played a similar role in section 1 decisions. It would
seem equally clear that this doctrine does not translate the Rule of
Reason into an apology for imperfect competition. Indeed, the second
American Tobacco decision merges and equates conscious parallelism
with the Rule of Reason as construed by Hand in Alcoa, resting both on
what is essentially an assumption that certain market structures, coupled
with a particular pattern of behavior, produce a prohibited result. That
result is "not that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when
it is desired to do so."" Hence, conscious parallelism comes rather close
to, although it cannot be equated with, those per se rules so vigorously
attacked by a majority of the Attorney General's Committee as inconsistent with theories of workable competition.6 9
Other section 1 decisions offer additional evidence of a judicial trend
toward the per se concept and away from complex economic reasoning.
Thus, in the twelve criminal proceedings initiated against trade associations during the first quarter of 1959, the courts affirmed the Government's contention that price cutting, exclusion or boycott of computing
firms, associations embracing competitors at different levels of an industry, and overly methodical policing of members to guarantee adherence
to the association policies are all per se offenses under section 1, and that
trade association membership is a per se offense whenever unlawful behavior can be imputed to the parent organization. 70 Further, pricefixing 71 and the imposition by manufacturers of some territorial and
customer restrictions on distributors 72 continue to be regarded as per se
violations under section 1.
What, then, are the broader implications of recent Sherman Act rulings? First, care must be taken to avoid the error earlier imputed to the
optimistic commentators that these decisions represent a toughening of
antitrust policy within the traditional meaning of that concept. They are
68 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
69 It is true, of course, that conscious parallelism has had a declining career during the
past decade and that the Court has observed that "'conscious parallelism' has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." (Theatre Enterprise, Inc. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)). However, two observations are in order
here. First, the Court has been hesitant to reverse a factual finding by either the FTC or
the trial courts that conscious parallelism does not exist in a given situation. Moreover,
the FTC, in particular, has not been well disposed toward the doctrine in recent years.
Second, the Antitrust Division has been inclined to accept the view of the Attorney
General's Report and has therefore hesitated to rest its charges in whole or in part on
conscious parallelism. Perhaps, then, administrative agencies should assume major responsibility for eclipse of the doctrine.
70 See Wilson, "The Eisenhower Antitrust Policy: Progressivism or Conservatism?" 32
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 179, 188 (1960); Withrow, "Trade Associations," 4 Antitrust Bull. 173
(1959).
71 Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
72 Handier, "Recent Antitrust Developments," 13 Record of N.Y.C. B.A. 417, 434 (1958).
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not oriented primarily toward limiting the size of individual firms nor at
prohibiting large concentrations of economic power. Nor do they seek
to disintegrate existing centers of power through the traditional remedies
of dissolution, divorce, and divestiture. On the contrary, government attempts at trust-busting were rebuffed in the great majority of these
instances. Second, the essential test of legitimacy implied by these decisions appears to be a simplified market-structure analysis; 7' beyond a
certain point in size and below a certain number of firms, illegal conduct
(such as price-fixing and exclusion of competitors) can be assumed. The
empirical, economic evidence of industry behavior need not be tortuously
examined. Third, a simplified market structure analysis, at least when
employed in the manner referred to here, would appear to depart rather
widely from current notions of imperfect and monopolistic competition.
It is true, of course, that monopoly in the legal sense has usually been
thought to mean abusive or restrictive practices, while monopoly in the
economic sense has been equated with control of the market. It is also
true that market structure is recognized as one significant aspect of
market control. But it must be emphasized that recent judicial doctrine
employs market structure tests first as a means to the more basic end of
ascertaining the existence of illegal practices and second as a device for
identifying power situations which may be objectionable on other than
economic grounds; market control in an economic sense is not necessarily
an offense. As indicated earlier, there are more fundamental and tradionally constitutional objections to the forbidden practices and to the
prohibited power situations than mere economic dominance over a specified market area; these objections we shall inspect more closely in the
conclusion. Finally, there is a notable absence of complex economic
analysis in recent Sherman Act cases. Many economists, particularly those
who emphasize performance rather than market structure tests, view this
as proof that the courts are employing economic reasoning in an inadequate manner. Such an indictment is largely irrelevant, however, if, as
we indicate here, the judiciary has not accepted a model of imperfect
competition as its dominant organizing concept.
What the Rule of Reason and Conscious Parallelism have been to the
Sherman Act, the doctrine of Quantitative Substantiality has been to the
Clayton Act. This concept occupies the central interpretive role in the
so-called vertical integration cases, 74 of which Standard Stations75 and
73 See Mason, "The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States,"
62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1949).
74 For a more complete delineation of the vertical integration theme see Kessler &
Stern, "Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration," 69 Yale LJ. 1 (1959).
75 Standard Oil Co. (California) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

(Vol. 46

DuPont-G.M.7 are perhaps the most representative. Here, again, is a
formula which does not fit easily into the theory of imperfect competition. Standard Stations raised the question of whether exclusive dealing
contracts imposed by the Standard Oil Company of California on its
retail outlets "substantially lessened competition" in the petroleum industry in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. The majority concluded that such contracts were an offense because, to borrow a phrase
from Kessler and Stem's excellent analysis, "When competitors are foreclosed from a substantial enough share of the market, it is not farfetched
to infer a substantial lessening of competition." 77 Does this imply that
exclusive dealing contracts are a per se offense and that all are prohibited
regardless of circumstances? Not quite, since the question of what is
"a substantial enough share of the market" must still be answered. It
would seem clear that the Court was not influenced by Standard's 6.7
per cent share of the Western retail market, but rather by the 65 per cent
share controlled by the seven major distributors, each of whom employed
exclusive dealing contracts similar to those used by Standard.78 Once
again, the underlying rationale of the decision appears to be a market
structure of market power analysis. Quantitative substantiality is thus
given much the same interpretation as were the Rule of Reason and the
Concept of Conscious Parallel Action in recent Sherman Act decisions.
Further, the majority in Standard Stations specifically rejects Mr. Justice
Jackson's argument that the economic consequences of voiding these
contracts in what is essentially an imperfect market will reduce rather
than increase the volume of competition. The Court, then, seems to be
taking something of a middle course between the per se idea and the
theory of imperfect competition.
The facts of the DuPont-GM. decision, which also constituted a case
of vertical integration, scarcely need repeating here. Essentially, the government charged that DuPont's acquisition of 23 per cent of G.M.'s stock
would "tend to create a monopoly" in violation of section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Court, however, construed "tend to create a monopoly" as
identical to the phrase "substantially lessen competition," citing Standard
Stations for the meaning of the latter, and, consequently, of both concepts. 79 Mr. Justice Brennan thereupon found that since G.M. controlled
over half the automobile market, and, since, further, DuPont supplied
"the largest part" of G.M.'s needs for fabrics and finishes, that "there
was a likelihood that competition may be 'foreclosed in a substantial
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
Kessler & Stem, supra note 74, at 28.
Id. at 30.
79 353 U.S. 586, 595 (1957).

76
77
78
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share'" of the market; thus, DuPont's interest in G.M. "tends to create
a monopoly." Although the relevant market was defined here as automotive finishes and fabrics, most critics are quick to point out that such
a market constitutes only a small portion of the total paint and fabric
market. Therefore, the likelihood for DuPont's control to "substantially"
reduce the competitive opportunities of other paint and fabric suppliers
is even less than the anti-competitive potential implicit in the Standard
Stations situation. One can only conclude that the simplified marketstructure test of the Standard case, and all that it implies, has been
affirmed and extended by DuPont-G.M.
While it is still too early to determine whether the Court will continue
to employ an essentially non-economic orientation in cases arising under
amended section 7, the Anti-Merger Act of 1950, the Youngstown-Bethlehem80 and the Maryland-VirginiaMilk Producers1 decisions afford some
indication that they will do so. The Federal Trade Commission, however,
in its Brillo,82 Crown-Zellerback83 and Scott Paper4 rulings appears content to follow the well-known Pillsbury85 precedent, requiring a thorough
market analysis of all relevant economic facts in determining the probbility of adverse competitive effects in section 7 cases.
A final observation on the doctrinal thrust of recent antitrust decisions
concerns George Stocking's allegation that three of the leading divorcement actions of the postwar period-Alcoa, United Shoe, and National
Lead 8 6-- reflect an almost total judicial preoccupation with theories of
imperfect competition.87 In all three cases the courts found that violations of the Sherman Act had occurred, but in none was divorcement
relief granted. Stocking remarks that in refusing to grant the requested
relief, the courts "attached greater weight to the industry's performance
than to its structure," ' thus grounding the analysis in each case on "a
broad conception of the principle of workable competition."8' 9 It is true
that all of these opinions show a careful examination of the usual factors
80 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
81 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C.
1958), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
82 Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 27,243 (FTC June 4, 1958).
83 Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) ff 26,923 (FTC Dec. 26,
1957).
84 Scott Paper Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 277.16 (FTC Jan. 5, 1959), reversing ff 27,312
(FTC Aug. 4, 1958).
85 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
86 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
87 See Stocking, "Economic Change and the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on Workable Competition," 4 Antitrust Bull. 375 (1959).
88 Id. at 394.
89 Id. at 396.
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bearing on industry performance-number and strength of firms, extent
of technological development, availability of close substitutes, etc.-but
whether they reveal enthusiastic judicial adoption of theories of imperfect competition is doubtful. It must be recalled, first, that courts are
essentially negative rather than positive formulators of regulatory .policy.
They are equipped with neither the knowledge nor the organization to
undertake the planning and restructuring of markets or the detailed direction of economic life. The tortuous course of the public utility rate
cases up to Hope Natural Gas and subsequent abandonment of judicial
efforts to create criteria for measurement of the rate-base provide rather
convincing evidence for this assertion. Second, what Donald Dewey
calls the innate conservatism of the courts'°--their unwillingness to disturb the existing property and contractual relationships among stockholders and employees of the affected firms-must be considered a cardinal factor in the fate of all divorcement actions. It is one thing to
assume that further concentrations of power will produce inequitable
results and to block it; it is quite another to anticipate the distributive
consequences of a positive reorganization of economic relations and to
adopt an economic model that will guarantee those consequences. While
the first may require some degree of sophisticated conjecture, the second
demands either omniscience or else an abiding faith in the economic
theory on which it rests. Hence, far from affirming a theory of imperfect competition, these decisions would appear to cast some doubt on its
viability.
III.
In conclusion, then, Rule of Reason, Conscious Parallelism, Quantitative Substantiality, etc., the dominant interpretive doctrines by means
of which the courts have fashioned current antitrust policy, veer away
from rather than toward the idea of imperfect, or even workable, competition. None requires or has been given the type of complex economic
analysis, particularly in terms of industry performance, that implementation of this idea would seem to require. But, if the courts have not read
imperfect competition into the Constitution as a fundamental organizing
concept, what has been the broader constitutional significance of their
work? Does a doctrinal position, sufficiently coherent to be identifiable,
emerge from recent antitrust decisions? If not, can one be fashioned
from the suggestions and implications of judicial reasoning?
The current search through judicial analysis for a grand organizing
theme, at once subordinating and encompassing pertinent economic and
90 Dewey, supra note 33, Ch. XVII.
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sociological concepts, has attracted a number of observers to the intriguing idea of "constitutionalizing" the major centers of private economic power. Arthur Miller, for example, argues that "the factory community should be recognized as a private government" and that "the
governing power, wherever located, should be subject to the fundamental
constitutional limitation of due process of law.""g Wolfgang Friedman
concludes that "The challenge to the contemporary lawyer is to translate
the social transformation of these organizations (corporations and unions) from private associations to public organisms into legal terms." 2
Berle, Wirtz, Buchanan and Hale have similarly commented upon the
public character of corporate power and upon the possibility of disciplin93
ing it within the framework of constitutional limitations.
This conceptualization has great appeal in logical and administrative
as well as in theoretical terms. Granted that certain private associations
possess governmental power (i.e., the capacity to affect in significant ways
the life of an entire community) and that a constitutional system is intended to define and to limit the exercise of such power, then it follows
that power existing outside the system must be brought within it; given
the premises, the argument is as simple as it is compelling. Moreover,
such an ingestion is facilitated administratively by the pre-existing pattern
of constitutional precedent fashioned through a century and a half of
judicial attention to the powers of state and federal agencies. Finally,
"constitutionalization" provides a convenient answer to some of the more
perplexing implications of pluralistic political theory. As Sheldon Wolin
has so forcefully emphasized in his Vision and Politics, modern social
theory (of which pluralist thought is but one strand) discovers "the
primary social realities in groups and associations, rather than in the
state."9 4 Hence, the political order is reduced to a "bookkeeping function" and the state is subordinated, at best, to a position of primus inter
pares and at worst to a mere "coordinator" of those few activities not
falling within the domain of private associational relationships. The idea
of constitutionalization, however, provides a theoretical basis upon which
to reassert the primacy of political government, to incorporate the particular into the general, and to provide a justification for harnessing the
pluralistic tendencies of modern society.
91 Miller, "The Constitutional Law of the 'Security State'," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 620, 663
(1958).

92 Friedman, "Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law," 57
Colum. L. Rev. 155, 176 (1957).
93 Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society (Fund for the Republic 1957); Wirtz,
"Government by Private Groups," 13 La. L. Rev. 440 (1953); Buchanan, The Corporation
and the Republic (Fund for the Republic 1958); Hale, Freedom Through Law (1952).
94 Wolin, Politics and Vision 314 (1960).
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But, if the general sweep of the idea attracts, the application perplexes.
Are all the basic constitutional limitations on power equally applicable
to private associations? If not, which ones are? Is it the procedures by
means of which private groups exercise economic and social authority
that are to be regularized, or is the substance of power itself to be
domesticated?
Thus far, academic analysis and judicial action have both centered
almost exclusively on due process as a constitutional device for regulating the exercise of authority by private persons and groups. Specifically,
state and national courts have initiated a tentative and selective restriction on the power of certain private groups performing public functions
-notably labor unions-in dealing with their members."5 A union exercising exclusive bargaining power, for example, is said to be under "an
affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect" the rights of all members and not "to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights
of those for whom it legislates ....9'Hence, a closed union and a closed
shop may not coexist in some jurisdictions.97 In others, members may not
be arbitrarily expelled or fined.98 In still others, the union may not arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to consider and to press the legitimate
grievance of an individual employee.99
That these few decisions amount to something less than a pervasive
constitutionalization of private power centers and that they have only
limited applicability to the antitrust problem is patent. Due process, even
in its substantive and particularly in its procedural dimension, has generally been limited to the protection of those persons who are directly
and immediately the subjects of a particular authority, and who are related to that authority by formal and definite lines of control. Thus it
may be invoked by citizens charged with violation of the law or by those
who claim to be arbitrarily injured by action of the state, or latterly by
members of a formal group the officers of which have behaved capriciously. The gravamen of monopoly, however, bears no such specific and
direct relationship to the welfare of each party who is injured by it. The
consumer who may lose freedom to choose from among competing prod95 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); James v. Marinship Corp., 25
Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Williams v. International Brotherhood, 27 Cal. 2d
586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946); Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946); Carroll
v. Local 269, 133 N.J.E.Q. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (1943); Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y. 1014, 80

N.E.2d 536 (1948).
98 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
97 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
98 Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A.2d 886 (1939); Thompson v. Grand
Brotherhood, 14 Tex. Ct. 467, 91 S.W. 834 (Civ. App. 1905).
99 Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle, Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958);
cf. Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957).
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ucts, or who may be forced to pay higher prices for inferior quality, the
competitor driven to the wall or severely restricted in the scope of his
activity, the potential entrant frustrated in the realization of his economic
objective-few of these can claim a clear organizational relationship to
the source of their ills nor can they in most cases show the kind of direct
impact on their fortunes which due process would seem to require.
(Wherever such direct injury can be demonstrated, of course, private
treble-damage proceedings are already available to some of them.) On
the contrary, the evils of monopoly and restrictive conduct are cumulative and generalized more often than they are discrete and direct; they
are less the issue of individualized and aberrant behavior than of a pervasive social ethic, a widely shared Weltanschaung, and a highly complicated system of business conduct.
If, then, the theoretical notion of constitutionalizing private centers of
economic power is to provide a useful basis for the control of monopoly,
a more flexible and tractable vehicle than due process is required. To this
end, the concept of equal protection of the laws merits careful consideration. Just as substantive due process with its inordinate emphasis on
individual rights to property and to contract was the central constitutional theme of an earlier day, so the idea of equality under law might be
viewed as the key to modern day constitutional development. An accelerating penetration of economic life by organs of the state inevitably
has shifted the constitutional focus from what have been called the
negative freedoms toward what may be labeled the positive freedoms:
emphasis is no longer placed primarily upon freedom from state interference, but rather upon freedom for the full enjoyment of such privileges
as earning a livelihood, achieving a decent standard of living, raising a
family, and other basic social objectives of a democratic society. Freedom
in this latter sense has been thought to require not only protection of the
individual from the arbitrary demands of public power, but also, and
equally, from unwarranted interference by the holders of private power.
It is this aspect of the libertarian idea that shares much in common with
equalitarianism. Both are oriented toward the positive promotion of
those conditions necessary for the full and equal enjoyment of the fruits
of social organization.
While the equal protection idea might well provide a more viable route
to the constitutionalization objective than does due process, and although
it would furnish a more comprehensive architectonic pattern for the
management of antitrust problems than current economic theories do,
yet the Court has not clearly articulated equality under law as the
foundation of its antitrust work. On the other hand, it can be argued that
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recent decisions in this area are thoroughly consistent with the implications and broader meaning of equalitarian doctrine and that the concept,
if carefully applied to the anti-monopoly objective, promises innovation
in an area heretofore either strait-jacketed by economic considerations
or beset by a turbulent sea of conflicting social theories. A closer look at
some recent decisions may reveal a few of these possibilities.
The heart of the constitutional idea of equality, whether derived from
the equal protection clause itself, the fifth amendment, the commerce
clause, or the first amendment, 10 0 has been the concept of reasonable
classification-the demand that when privileges are granted to, or restrictions are imposed upon, groups of individuals, that all who are similarly
situated be similarly treated and that the purpose of the classification be
legitimate. 01' Under conditions of modern economic life, privileges and
restrictions flow from the decisions of both public and private centers
of power: General Motors no less than the State of Michigan conditions
and defines the scope of what we have called the positive freedoms. This
being so, ultimate constitutional authority is as much concerned with
the reasonableness of those classifications resulting from private decisionmaking as it is with the classificatory consequences of public action. So,
price discrimination may arbitrarily advantage some purchasers at the
expense of others; conspiracy to monopolize or to restrain trade can
unreasonably restrict potential competitors to the profit of existing ones,
or unfairly discriminate against that class of consumers which views the
product in question as a necessity; full-blown monopoly may exacerbate
all of these discriminatory consequences.
The simplified market-structure analysis which seems to underpin most
of the leading antitrust doctrines could well be viewed, at bottom, as a
demand for reasonable classification in private economic decision-making.
Organizations, of course, cannot discriminate until they act, and it is the
practice not the structure which ultimately must be judged on equalitarian
grounds. But since the judiciary is no better equipped to police the details of all business conduct than it is to supervise the behavior of every
public agency, it must make assumptions about the potentially discriminatory effects of large configurations of economic power. Firms
in an oligopolistic industry may not discriminate against competitors,
potential entrants, or consumers, but then neither may juries from which
Negroes have been systematically excluded necessarily discriminate
100 For an extended analysis of the scope and limits of the equal protection concept see
Antieau, "Equal Protection Outside the Clause," 40 Calif. L. Rev. 362 (1952).
101 See Tussman & ten Broek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 Calif. L. Rev.
341 (1949); Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 182 (1955).
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against colored litigants whose cases are before them. Monopolies may
not arbitrarily exploit buyers, but then neither may licensing boards
which operate without the guidance of specific statutory standards necessarily discriminate unreasonably against licensees or applicants. In any
case, it is the likelihood of discrimination that will, under the equal protection concept, determine the ultimate judicial outcome. Hence, it is
upon the general configuration of the industry in question that crucial
assumptions about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of economic
decisions must be based. To the extent, of course, that certain conduct,
such as collusive price-fixing, can be proved and the anti-competitive
effects clearly and sharply demonstrated, such assumptions will be unnecessary. It is, however, precisely the difficulty of measuring the longrange, indirect impact of many varieties of suspect conduct upon all areas
of the economy that has contributed to the popularity of economic analysis
in the antitrust field and has cast the traditional per se concept into disrepute. We can probably expect to find fewer and fewer of these clearcut cases as time goes on.
But whether the root of analysis be conduct or inferences drawn from
structure, or both, what does it mean to apply reasonable classification
doctrine to an antitrust situation? Robinson-Patman Act cases offer perhaps the clearest and most simple illustration. Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,'02- forbids sellers from
discriminating in price between different purchasers of like grade and
quality, and prohibits buyers from inducing such discrimination. In a
sense, he who so discriminates creates by his decision two distinct classes:
those who are unreasonably denied an advantage and those who are inordinately benefited. Congress has declared that, unless price differentials
can be justified by demonstrated cost savings, there is no reasonable relationship between the maintenance of a free economy on the one hand
and the exclusion of certain persons from the favored group, on the
other. In construing the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court has in a
general sense continued to apply the spirit, if not the words, of this test.
In FTC v. Morton Salt Co. °3 the Court struck down a seller's differentiated
price system even though quantity discounts were, in theory, available
to all buyers. In fact, argued Mr. Justice Black, economic realities make
it impossible for all but a tiny handful of buyers to purchase in sufficiently large amounts to qualify for discounts. As with the licensing
ordinance in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the jury selection system in Smith v.
1o2 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1934), as amended by 49 Stat. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
103 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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Texas, and regiilations for the -use of public property in Niemotko v.
Maryland'0 4 (of which none, on its face, created an'unreasonable classification) it vas the fact of discriminatory application rather thai the
abstract -possibility of equal treatnient that was decisive. But perhaps
even more light is cast on the application of equal protection doctrine to
antitrust in Morton Salt by the narrow construction there given the
"injury to competition" phrase. Such injury was logically inferred from
the fact that some merchants were required to pay more for the product
than were their competitors. It was the heavier burden borne by the one
group rather than the total amount of competition restrained or the
possibility that some of the disadvantaged might, by extra effort, overcome the effects of their burden which was conclusive for the Court.
Similarly might the "quantitative substantiality ' doctrine be explained
in equalitarian terms. In neither the anti-merger nor the exclusive dealership cases can it well be argued that prohibition is likely to increase the
number of new entrants sufficiently to allow for effective price competition. Neither is it likely that judicial restriction of these devices will
reduce price significantly and improve quality for the consumer. Both
practices are likely to occur in those industries involving a high percentage of fixed costs and a natural inclination toward oligopoly. Hence, a
judicial negative will probably do little positively to increase the amount
of competition beyond existing levels. To prohibit mergers and exclusive
dealerships, then, whenever their effect on competition is "quantitatively
substantial" is primarily to deny to the firms involved power to create
discriminatory classifications under conditions currently prevailing in the
industry: that is, to prevent existing competitors from bearing heavier
burdens than those who enjoy the advantages of either practice, and to
preserve for consumers whatever degree of price or quality competition
presently exists. In seeking thus to preserve the prevailing distribution
of burdens and advantages within an industry, the Court interdicts only
those practices which are sufficiently inequitable to satisfy the demands
of classification analysis. If the courts have never demanded that classifications established by public agencies have a perfectly symmetrical
relationship to the objective sought-have never, in short, required that
all who are similarly situated with respect to that objective, and no others,
be included in the class singled out for special treatment-then they can
hardly impose such an administratively impossible demand on "private"
governments. The anticipated illegal consequences must be more than
o104340 U.S. 268 (1951); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Smith v. Texas, 311

U.S. 128 (1940);
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de minimis yet less than predominant to be actionable under traditional
classification analysis.
While the application of equal protection doctrine to other representative antitrust situations could be explored at much greater length, the
purpose here is suggestive and exploratory rather than exhaustive and
analytical. We have sought to discover a rationale which is more satisfactory in constitutional terms than the currently popular economic
orientation. We have sought, moreover, for a theoretical base not inconsistent with the dominant facts of industrial organization. If, then, recent
antitrust decisions can legitimately be evaluated in equal protection
terms, rather than within the narrower confines of economic theory, the
traditional dichotomy between per se rules and complex economic analysis becomes somewhat irrelevant. The requirement for reasonable classification and equal treatment is not intended to guarantee the survival of
every would-be competitor, regardless of experience, ability, or resources,
nor can it provide impartial protection to each individual consumer. It
seeks to rationalize relationships among and within large groups, rather
than to guarantee personal rights and privileges; it is directed primarily
to a reasonable use of power under existent conditions and specified
policy aims, rather than to an authoritarian formulation of these conditions and aims. Hence, it can and must accept the reality of large-scale
enterprise, seeking only to restrain and to control its consequences. On
the other hand, the equalitarian idea encompasses values other than, and
in addition to, that of economic efficiency. It cannot afford to become
captive of an analysis which is aimed exclusively at such a limited objective.
It is in this sense that the constitutional idea of equality provides a
middle route between the per se extremes of individualism and the collectivist implications of theories of imperfect competition. At the same
time, it offers an effective possibility for translating economic formulae
into thei more fundamental requirements of constitutional doctrine. Finally, it facilitates an accommodation between popular demands for national security and the traditional desire for constitutional limitations on
the exercise of power-be that power public or private. We might well
conclude, then, with Eugene Rostow's observation that "Economic activity, after all, is a means as well as an end in the hierarchy of Democratic ambitions. An economy should be judged by what it adds to the
wealth of a nation. .

.

. Beyond that goal, judgment should measure its

effect on men, on politics, and on the values and culture of the society."' 10 5
105 Rostow, Planning for Freedom 3 (1959).

